The coalition of the compromised
The president isn't the only one compromised. Somewhere between 50 and 400 senior US officials are exposed to the same underlying material — different people, same vulnerability. They cohere as a defensive bloc not because they agree on policy but because the cost of defecting is unequal across the group. Whoever has the most to lose makes the loudest case for staying loyal. The two leverage holders, Israel and Russia, don't share goals — but they share the goal of keeping the president in place.
Across the turns
The starting condition. Israeli and Russian kompromat over the president plus a network of senior officials, with the two holders pulling in opposite directions on most things but aligned on the principal. Russia depends on Iranian drone production for its own military, which creates the first identifiable point of leverage conflict: if a kinetic option would damage Iranian drone production, the Israeli leverage pushes the president toward yes and the Russian leverage pushes him toward no.
The first behavioral tell. The president publicly backs Israel while quietly blocking the actions Russia would dislike. Allies notice — formal demarches from the UK, Germany, France, and Japan. A handful of senior military officers go on record about it. The compromise crosses from rumor into "people who watch this for a living can see it."
A piece of the actual kompromat lands in opposition lawyers' hands, via an allied intelligence service. Three to nine named senior officials. The compromise stops being inferred and starts being documented.
Coalition starts cracking around the edges. Cabinet defections begin. The NORTHCOM commander gets fired for refusing to deploy troops domestically. A small "constitutional caucus" forms inside the president's own party.
First real Senate test. The fourth career impeachment fails to convict — between 55 and 58 votes out of the 67 needed, with 4–13 party defectors. The coalition holds, but only by single digits. CASS starts arguing that the defection-cost-is-unequal point is the thing the federation isn't modeling.
A second impeachment of the same term gets introduced; the Senate punts the trial to turn 7. A 25th Amendment attempt fails again on a cabinet split. CASS argues explicitly that the coalition is more fragile than the visible cohesion suggests. The federation hears the argument and doesn't move the central estimate.
Second impeachment trial actually happens, late November / early December 2027. Acquittal — but at the closest margin yet, with the most defectors of any of the four trials. Still nowhere near 67. The federation finally moves the survival estimate downward.
Into T8
Going into turn 8, the federation puts the odds of a fifth impeachment getting introduced at around 32%, possibly as high as 50%. The more interesting question isn't about Senate votes — it's whether one of the leverage holders breaks the equilibrium by dumping material calibrated to the 2028 primary calendar. That's exactly the kind of move the federation can't see coming.
What this model can't answer
The federation can't model how Moscow decides when to release more of what it has, and it can't see whether the 150-or-so officials in the coalition talk to each other about their shared exposure. Both questions have been carried as open every turn.